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Essays
Around the World in Eighty Centiliters
Jim Chen*
The conversion of the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade into
the Minnesota Journal of International Law marks a trans-
formative moment in the history of the University of Minnesota
Law School. This journal's student editors have elected to tackle
the larger world of issues in international law, including but not
limited to the law of international trade. On this happy occasion,
those of us who have watched the newly reformulated journal
since its founding greet the Minnesota Journal of International
Law with best wishes for its future. To this journal's editors, its
contributors, and its readers, genuine friends of the old Minnesota
Journal of Global Trade and the new Minnesota Journal of
International Law raise a hearty toast.
One particular aspect of this transition warrants special
praise. Only rarely, after all, does tradition for its own sake
coincide with forward-looking wisdom. The Minnesota Journal of
International Law has pledged never to forget the intellectual
roots of the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade in the law of inter-
national trade. By virtue of its specialized focus throughout its
first fourteen years, the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade adv-
anced an implicit mission of alleviating human misery and
advancing the human condition whenever feasible.1 Undoubtedly
the new Minnesota Journal of International Law will retain its
predecessor's ethically laudable commitment. Therefore, even as
we honor this journal's past accomplishments and anticipate its
future triumphs, "[1]et us pause in life's pleasures and count its
many tears / While we all sup sorrow with the poor."2
* Associate Dean for Faculty and James L. Krusemark Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota Law School. Gil Grantmore, Y.S. Lee, and Chantal Thomas provided
helpful comments. Marci Windsheimer and Suzanne Thorpe made very valuable
contributions to the research underlying this essay. Special thanks to Kathleen Chen.
1. See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
2. Stephen Collins Foster, Hard Times (Come Again No More) (1855). For
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The sorry truth is' that the blessings of economic and political
liberty have not fallen equally on all members of the human
family. International law faces no greater challenge. For the pri-
vileged of this earth, those fortunate enough to live in wealthy
countries enjoying democracy and political stability, "[biliss [is] it
in [this] dawn to be alive" and "to be young [is] very heaven."3 The
modal condition of humanity, however, leaves much to be desired.
What C.P. Snow said two generations ago unfortunately still holds
sway: 'Most of our fellow human beings... are underfed and die
before their time. In the crudest terms, that is the social con-
dition."4 Relieving such stark inequities represents the highest
calling for those of us who call ourselves social progressives, those
"whose implicit social welfare functions .. . weigh gains for the
relatively disadvantaged quite heavily, while believing that gains
for the relatively prosperous have few real utility effects."5 Inter-
national law, particularly the law of trade and development, plays
a vital role in the "new era of global interdependence" that he-
ralded the "turning point in [human] history" that has been
reached and passed "in the aftermath of two world wars."6 That
all of us who "inhabit[] ... Planet Earth share a common destiny,
is a historical fact, a political fact, an economic fact, a sociological
fact, that has finally penetrated the [global] consciousness."7
The very act of raising a toast provides an ideal metaphor by
which to assess the interplay of trade, taxation, and social justice.
Throughout the world, a significant measure of legal history
expresses itself through public controversies over beverages.8 In
matters of legal scholarship, a glass of beer is worth a "page of
compelling versions of this classic American ballad, hear BOB DYLAN, GOOD AS I BEEN
To You (Sony 1992); EASTMOUNTAINSOUTH, EASTMOUNTAINSOUTH (Dreamworks
2003); NANCI GRIFFITH, OTHER VOICES, Too (A TRIP BACK TO BOUNTIFUL) (Elektra
1998); EMMYLOU HARRIS, AT THE RYMAN (Reprise 1992); JENNIFER WARNES, SHOT
THROUGH THE HEART (BMG 1994).
3. WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, The Prelude, in THE MAJOR WORKS 375, 550
(Stephen Gill ed., 2000).
4. C.P. SNOW, THE Two CULTURES: AND A SECOND LOOK 6-7 (2d ed. 1965); see
also id. at 7 ("There is a moral trap which comes through th[is] insight into man's
loneliness: it tempts one to sit back, complacent in one's unique tragedy, and let the
others go without a meal.").
5. Mark Kelman, Could Lawyers Stop Recessions? Speculations on Law and
Macroeconomics, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1224 (1993).
6. Harold J. Berman, World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1617, 1621 (1995).
7. Id.
8. See generally Jim Chen, The Potable Constitution, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 1
(1998); cf. Aside, Don't Cry Over Filled Milk: The Neglected Footnote Three to Carolene
Products, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (1988).
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history" and "a volume of logic."9  The United States' nation-
founding revolution arguably began with the Boston Tea Party,
and stiff excise taxes on whiskey sparked a western uprising in
1794 against the infant Republic merely seven years after the
framing of its current Constitution.10 Only a wealthy society
blinded by its "intellectual hostility ... to the study of 'farm' law"11
would fail to understand that whiskey is nothing less than wheat
in liquid, portable, and durable form. Ah, "wheat, the king of all
grains,"'12 made at once portable and potable. Ours is a potable
Constitution, a legal tradition in which many generations of
lawyers have floated to wisdom on a stream of milk. 13 Twice the
United States has amended its Constitution on the subject of
"intoxicating liquors,"'14 and to this day "[t]he transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United
States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in
violation of the laws thereof," is the only private activity besides
slavery that directly violates the Constitution.15 Suffice it to say
that few things have "provok[ed] as much human strife and nasti-
ness as strong alcoholic beverages" and milk.16
The production, marketing, and delivery of beverages-from
grain, vine, or cow to the mug, glass, or cup-are enterprises "so
9. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921); cf. A-E. HOUSMAN,
Terence, This Is Stupid Stuff, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OFA.E. HOUSMAN 88, 88 (Owl
Books, rev. ed. 1971) ('And malt does more than Milton can / To justify God's ways to
man.").
10. See 1 SAMUEL ELIOT MORRISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 182 (1927).
11. Neil D. Hamilton, The Study of Agricultural Law in the United States, 43
ARK. L. REV. 503, 511 (1990); see also Neil D. Hamilton, Agriculture Without Farmers?
Is Industrialization Restructuring American Food Production and Threatening the
Future of Sustainable Agriculture?, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 613, 619 (1994) (documenting
the "gulf between our apparent concerns for health and our understanding of the
scientific and economic processes of agriculture'); cf. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE
OF REFORM: BRYAN TO FDR 23 (1955) ("America grew up on the farm and moved to the
city.").
12. O.E. ROLVAAG, GIANTS IN THE EARTH 110 (Lincoln Colcord & O.E. R6lvaag
trans., 1927). See generally Jim Chen, Filburn's Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719 (2003)
(describing the impact of wheat cultivation and its regulation, as resolved in Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), on American constitutional law).
13. Cf. Jim Chen, Get Green or Get Out: Decoupling Environmental from
Economic Objectives in Agricultural Regulation, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 333, 346 (1995)
("[Tlhe Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence can be written in
milk.').
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
15. Id. amend. XXI, § 2; see Laurence H, Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution
Without Really Trying: Lessons from the Repeal of Prohibition to the Balanced Budget
Amendment, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 217, 219 (1995).
16. Queensboro Farms Prods., Inc. v. Wickard, 137 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1943).
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vast that fully to comprehend [them] would require an almost uni-
versal knowledge ranging from geology, biology, chemistry and
medicine to the niceties of the legislative, judicial and admini-
strative processes of government." 17 So extensive are the legal
complexities at issue that the typical North American coffee
service, standing alone, can traverse nearly the entire range of
allocative and redistributive considerations within the law of
domestic and international trade.18 A simple carafe of coffee, with
cream and sugar on the side, vividly illustrates the tradeoff
between comparative advantage and redistributive goals in the
formation of trade policies.
The three items on the coffee table--coffee, cream, and
sugar-represent not only two of the leading plant species in
humanity's collective larder 19 but also the leading species in hum-
anity's strikingly narrow collection of domesticated animals.20
Thanks to their prominence within global agricultural markets,
the items in the traditional coffee service embody great legal signi-
ficance. Each of these three commodities strikes a different
balance between trade, taxation, redistribution, and justice.
Coffee itself is a largely unregulated global commodity, while
dairy products are subject to intensive forms of domestic regu-
lation that shift wealth from poorer consumers toward richer
producers. 21 The wealthy countries of North America and Europe,
with some of the highest labor costs in the world, might be
expected to import most or all of their sugar. These countries'
contrary propensity to produce their own sugar conceals an
obnoxious transnational wealth transfer from poor to rich.
Among the ingredients of the coffee service, the coffee itself is
the likeliest target for a direct excise tax. Although most
17. Id. at 975.
18. For distinct analyses of the similarities and differences between the law of
free trade within the United States and in the international community, see Daniel A.
Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT's-Eye View of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401 (1994); John 0. McGinnis &
Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511 (2000).
19. See generally Robert Prescott-Allen & Christine Prescott-Allen, How Many
Plants Feed the World?, 4 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 365 (1990).
20. See JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN
SOCIETIES 159-61, 168 (1997) (identifying no more than fourteen successful
"candidates for domestication"--cow, sheep, goat, pig, horse, the one-humped Arabian
camel, the two-humped Bactrian camel, llama and alpaca, donkey, reindeer, water
buffalo, yak, banteng, and gaur-among "the world's 148 big wild terrestrial
herbivorous mammals").
21. See Daniel A. Farber, Positive Theory as Normative Critique, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1565, 1571 (1995).
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American jurisdictions exempt food from otherwise generally app-
licable sales taxes,22 states and localities often do tax coffee on the
theory that coffee, tea, and carbonated beverages are not essential
commodities.23 There is, however, little or no official control over
the price of coffee. Producers have often tried, without much suc-
cess, to control wholesale coffee prices through an OPEC-style
cartel of coffee-exporting countries. 24 As a result, the primary
institution that modulates coffee prices is the trading pit of the
Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange in New York City.
The United States' closest approach to any sort of compre-
hensive regulation of the coffee trade came in November 2002,
when Berkeley, California, considered an initiative to restrict all
brewed coffee sales in the city to beverages brewed from beans
that are certified organic, "fair-trade," shade-grown, or some
combination thereof.2 5 Although the cluster of interests embraced
by the movement for "Socially and/or Environmentally Con-
sciously Cultivated Coffee" is quite complex, advocates for the
"SEC-C coffee" movement seek generally to transfer the wealth of
bourgeois coffee sippers in North America to preferred growers in
the global south.26 The voters of the famously liberal city of
Berkeley rejected the measure by a margin of 70% to 30%, 26,712
votes to 11,172.27 The failure of the Berkeley coffee referendum
consigns coffee to the relatively unregulated realm in which
market forces play the greatest role in shaping prices, market
structures, and consumer preferences.
Unlike coffee, milk and sugar will probably escape direct
taxation. Courts have acknowledged, albeit begrudgingly at
22. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 34; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-5102 (2004);
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6359 (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-26-707 (2005); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 205.94d(1) (2004).
23. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-39.2-.04.1 (2005).
24. See generally Matthew J. Foli, Note, International Coffee Agreements and the
Elusive Goal of Price Stability, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 79 (1995).
25. See City of Berkeley Election Information, 2002 Ballot Measure Info: Ballot
Measures: Measure 0, http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/elections/measures2002/
Ocoffee.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
26. See SEC-C Coffee for Berkeley, http://www.geocities.comlcoffeelawinfo (last
visited Sept. 26, 2005). According to this movement's adherents, the acronym "SEC-C
coffee" is supposed to be pronounced "sexy coffee." The humor of having such a
politically incorrect name for a politically correct movement somehow got lost in the
defeat of the Berkeley coffee initiative.
27. See Charles Burress, Back to the Same Old Grind Mandating a Politically
Correct Cup of Coffee Fails in Berkeley, SAN FRANcIsco CHRON., Nov. 6, 2002, at
A28; City of Berkeley Election Information, General Info: 2002 Election Results,
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/elections/general/results/2002_Nov/final.htm (last visited
Sept. 26, 2005).
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times, that these commodities are well-nigh essential to bourgeois
life in America. 28 Yet both milk and sugar are "taxed" in any rea-
listic sense of the word. Indeed, to argue that neither milk nor
sugar is taxed by the federal government insults the intelligent
observer.29 Since its Depression-era inception in the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937,30 the federal scheme of "dairy
regulation [has] levie[d] the heaviest taxes against poorer people
to subsidize mainly richer farmers. 31 The federal milk marketing
order system is outlandishly complex: 'Milk is sort of like the
international gold system .... Only a handful of people claim to
understand it, and most of them are lying."32
Reduced to their essentials, federal milk marketing orders
attempt simultaneously to rationalize dairy markets and to raise
prices received by farmers.33 Milk marketing orders address the
"two distinctive and essential phenomena of the milk industry"
that have historically brought chaos to dairy marketing and de-
pressed prices: "a basic two-price structure that permits a higher
return for the same product, depending on its ultimate use, and
the cyclical characteristic of production."3 4  Cows produce signi-
ficantly more milk in the spring and summer than in the fall and
winter.35 Demand, on the other hand, is relatively steady year-
28. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994); Polar Ice
Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 377-78 (1964); Two Guys from
Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 585 (1961); Dean Milk Co. v. City
of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18
(1944); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 149-50 & n.3 (1938);
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1935); United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 10, 12 (1895). See generally Aside, supra note 8.
29. Cf. Jim Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy: Economic
Analysis of Law in a New Key, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1315, 1358 (1995) ("[N]o-net-cost' to
the federal fisc assuredly does not mean 'no-tax."').
30. Act of June 3, 1937, ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 601-24, 671-74 (2000)).
31. Robert Tempest Masson & Philip M. Eisenstat, The Pricing Policies and
Goals of Federal Milk Order Regulations: Time for Reevaluation, 23 S.D. L. REV. 662,
663 (1978).
32. Scotti Kilman, Why the Price of Milk Depends on the Distance from Eau
Claire, Wisconsin, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1991, at Al.
33. This effort to "traverse the labyrinth of the federal milk marketing
regulation provisions," Smyser v. Block, 760 F.2d 514, 515-16 (3d Cir. 1985), is
derived from Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 172 (1969). See generally Neil Brooks,
The Pricing of Milk Under Federal Marketing Orders, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181
(1958); Reuben A. Kessel, Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of Milk Markets,
10 J.L. & ECON. 51 (1967).
34. Zuber, 396 U.S. at 172.
35. See Smyser, 760 F.2d at 515.
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round and reaches its minimum when schools are out of session.36
As a result, dairy farmers must maintain herds sufficient to meet
the fall and winter demand for fluid milk products that cannot be
stored for long periods of time. As a result, peak production
creates an inevitable surplus known as the "spring flush."37 Sur-
plus milk is directed to nonfluid products such as cheese and
butter, which enables milk to be stored and transported in less
perishable form.38 Milk that is ultimately used for fluid purposes
has traditionally commanded a higher price than milk of the same
grade and quality used for manufactured products. 39 "Cutthroat"
competition among producers for more profitable fluid milk sales
can reduce prices overall.40
Federal milk marketing orders are designed to distribute the
economic burden of surplus milk among all producers in a regional
market. The orders classify milk according to its ultimate use-
fluid (class I) or nonfluid (classes II and 111)-and fix uniform
minimum prices that all "handlers"-the statutory term for the
middlemen who process and market milk-must pay for each
class, "subject only to adjustments for (1) volume, market, and
production differentials customarily applied by the handlers
subject to such order, (2) the grade or quality of the milk pur-
chased, and (3) the locations at which delivery of such milk, or any
use classification thereof, is made to such handlers."41 Although
handlers pay a higher uniform minimum price for class I milk,
producers receive one uniform price-the "blended" price-for all
their milk regardless of its ultimate use. Additional adjustments
encourage farmers to stabilize their production year-round. 42
The blended price is approximately the weighted average
price of all milk of all use classifications sold under the order
during a given period.43 Paying each farmer according to the
marketwide utilization of milk rather than the utilization of milk
from a particular farm eliminates competition among farmers to
sell their milk for fluid use.44 A so-called "Producer Settlement
Fund" resolves the discrepancy between prices paid by handlers
36. See id. at 515-16.
37. Id. at 516.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. See id.; Brooks, supra note 33, at 181-83.
41. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(A) (2000).
42. See Smyser, 760 F.2d at 516.
43. Id.
44. Id.
2006]
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and prices received by producers. 45 Handlers whose "use value"
(the weighted average uniform price of the milk they purchased)
exceeds the blended price must contribute the difference to the
fund, and handlers whose use value was less than the blended
price may withdraw the difference from the fund.46
Quite notably, Congress aggressively defends the federal
dairy program against even remote threats.47 In apparent res-
ponse to the 1994 Supreme Court decision in West Lynn Creamery,
Inc. v. Healy,48 which invalidated a Massachusetts scheme to raise
wholesale prices received by in-state dairy farmers, Congress rati-
fied the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact in 1996.49 Over
objections that the compact would insulate the New England milk-
shed from fierce competition by other dairy-producing regions,
Congress ratified the compact in order to deliver income support
to dairy farmers throughout New England. 50 The Northeast
Interstate Dairy Compact thus became part of the 1996 "farm
bill," the federal government's periodic overhaul of its agricultural
legislation. 5 1 This episode represents only one of two instances
since 1987 in which the United States Congress has overridden a
Supreme Court decision vindicating freedom of interstate trade
under the so-called Dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.52
Laws regulating the production and pricing of dairy products
in the United States cannot be rationalized on grounds of national
food security. The United States emerged from World War II with
so much surplus agricultural capacity that it has been feeding the
rest of the world ever since. Congressional "findings" that under-
45. Id.
46. Id.; Kessel, supra note 33, at 54-55.
47. Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 327 (1936) (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting) ("At times, . . the waves of causation will have radiated so far that their
undulatory motion, if discernible at all, will be too faint or obscure, too broken by cross-
currents, to be heeded by the law.").
48. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
49. For the text of the compact, see S.J. Res. 28, 104th Cong. (1995).
50. See S. REP. No. 103-333, at 33-34 (1994) (accompanying S. 2069, 103d Cong.
(1994)) (additional views of Sen. Hatch). For further discussion of the dairy compact,
see generally Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 132 F.3d 1467, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 949 F. Supp. 882, 885-88 (D.D.C. 1996).
51. See Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-127, § 147, 110 Stat. 888, 919-20 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7256 (2000)); see also
Announcement of Implementation of the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, 61 Fed.
Reg. 44,290 (Aug. 28, 1996) (announcing the authorization and implementation of the
compact by Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman).
52. See Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional Acquiescence and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1786 (2004).
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state "the ability of the United States to produce food and fiber in
sufficient quantities" 53 defy credibility. Rather, perennial agri-
cultural surpluses give the United States a regulatory challenge
at home and political opportunities abroad. 54 Public Law 480,55
America's premier food aid statute, was intended not only to
relieve pressure on federal price and income support programs,
but also to export prosperity and capitalism. 56 Though this aid
conferred relatively little on its foreign recipients,5 7 Public Law
480 converted domestic agricultural surpluses into one of the
leading foreign policy instruments of the Cold War.58 The super-
ficially charitable slogan "food for peace" obscured fiscal waste and
collateral damage to agricultural self-sufficiency in recipient
countries.5 9 (Those problems, of course, are the very albatrosses
that globalization's most vocal critics have tried to hang from the
necks of contemporary aid agencies, particularly the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank.)6 0 The upshot is simple:
"Only a nation that is obscenely rich by the West's historical
standards and the larger world's contemporary standards can
indulge in food aid either as a means of suppressing domestic
supplies or as a tool for shaping foreign relations, much less
both."61 From the perspective of the First World, where nuclear
53. Farmland Protection Policy Act § l(a)(3), 7 U.S.C. § 4201(a)(3) (2000).
54. See generally Vernon W. Ruttan, The Politics of U.S. Food Aid Policy: A
Historical Review, in WHY FOOD AID? 2 (Vernon W. Ruttan ed., 1993).
55. Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-
480, 68 Stat. 454 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
56. See Willard W. Cochrane, Farm Technology, Foreign Surplus Disposal, and
Domestic Supply Control, 41 J. FARM ECON. 885 (1959), reprinted in WHY FOOD AID?,
supra note 54, at 39; Mordecai Ezekiel, Apparent Results in Using Surplus Food for
Financing Economic Development, 40 J. FARM ECON. 915, 915 (1958).
57. See Theodore W. Schultz, Value of U.S. Farm Surpluses to Underdeveloped
Countries, 42 J. FARM ECON. 1019 (1960), reprinted in WHY FOOD AID?, supra note 54,
at 53.
58. See Food for Peace Act of 1966, Pub L. No. 89-808, § 2(A), (B), 80 Stat. 1526,
1526-28 (declaring a policy of "us[ing] the abundant agricultural productivity of the
United States... to promote ... the foreign policy of the United States," including a
condition that countries receiving American food aid be "friendly" and 'independent of
domination or control by any world Communist movement") (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 1691, 1701, 1703). See generally Ruttan, supra note 54, at 9-26.
59. See Emma Rothschild, Is It Time to End Food for Peace?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Mar. 13, 1977, at 15, reprinted in WHY FOOD AID?, supra note 54, at 84.
60. See, e.g., Michael H. Shuman, GATTzilla v. Communities, 27 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 527, 537-39 (1994); Robert Wolf, The Regionalist Answer, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 610, 613-14 & n.7 (2000).
61. Jim Chen, Epiphytic Economics and the Politics of Place, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 1, 34 (2001). See generally Symposium, Malthus, Mendel, and Monsanto:
Intellectual Property and the Law and Politics of Global Food Supply, 19 J. ENVTL. L.
& LITIG. 397 (2004). For a summary of the United States' current food aid policy, see
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
war is a more salient threat than mass starvation, food security
contributes less to trade policy than to military strategy.62
This leaves sugar. Universal in its allure across human
cultures and animal species, 63 sweetness may be "the prototype of
all desire."64 At the very least, sweetness historically commanded
a special cultural status before mass production of cane sugar via
slave labor and, eventually, the advent of synthetic sweeteners
cheapened sweetness as sensation and as metaphor. 65 Under the
law of the United States, sugar also differs in one key respect.
Whereas most federal agricultural programs seek to suppress
perennial surpluses of supported commodities, the United States
is not and probably never will be self-sufficient in sugar. There-
fore, American sugar policy since its inception has relied on
aggressive import management and protection of domestic
producers. 66
This program succeeds like no other in transferring wealth
from the poor to the rich.67 Like many other programs, the sugar
program relies on nonrecourse loans as its primary price support
mechanism. 68 If a participating producer defaults on a non-
recourse loan, the government's sole remedy lies in collecting the
commodities that underlie the loan. Nonrecourse loans thus guar-
antee an effective minimum price to participating producers. 69
Congress has set the presumptive loan rate at $0.18 a pound for
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127,
§§ 201, 203, 110 Stat. 888, 951-953 (amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 1691a, 1702); Vernon W.
Ruttan, Does Food Aid Have a Future?, 80 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 572 (1998). On
domestic food supply policy during the last period of serious food insecurity in
American history, see generally Guadalupe T. Luna, The New Deal and Food
Insecurity in the "Midst of Plenty," 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 213 (2004).
62. See generally PAUL B. THOMPSON, THE ETHICS OF AID AND TRADE: U.S. FOOD
POLICY, FOREIGN COMPETITION, AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 20-40 (1992) (analyzing
the United States' geopolitical use of the "food weapon" during the Cold War).
63. See MICHAEL POLLAN, THE BOTANY OF DESIRE: A PLANT'S-EYE VIEW OF THE
WORLD 19 (2001).
64. Id. at 18.
65. See id.
66. See Jones-Costigan Act of 1934, ch. 263, 48 Stat. 670; Sugar Act of 1937, ch.
898, 50 Stat. 903; Sugar Act of 1948, ch. 519, 61 Stat. 922; Secretary of Agriculture v.
Central Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. 604 (1950).
67. See generally Katherine E. Monahan, U.S. Sugar Policy: Domestic and
International Repercussions of Sour Law, 15 HASTINGS INTL & COMP. L. REV. 325,
338-45 (1992).
68. See 7 U.S.C. § 7272 (2000). See generally REMY JURENAS, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF: SUGAR POLICY ISSUES (Mar. 23, 2005), available at
http://www.ncseonline.orgnle/crsreports/O5marIB95117.pdf.
69. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 646 F.2d
1064, 1067 (5th Cir. 1981).
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raw cane sugar 70 and $0.229 a pound for refined beet sugar.7 1
These rates are substantially higher than the usual price for sugar
on the global market.7 2 On the surface, such a high loan rate
would result in huge forfeitures; sugar imports would drive the
domestic price down toward the prevailing world price. Domestic
cane and beet producers would default on their nonrecourse loans,
and the Commodity Credit Corporation, the arm of the United
States Department of Agriculture that ordinarily impounds com-
modities surrendered to the government in lieu of payments on
nonrecourse loans, would effectively own every pound of
domestically produced sugar. The Department of Agriculture,
however, operates under a mandate to manage the sugar program
"at no cost to the Federal Government by avoiding the forfeiture of
sugar to the Commodity Credit Corporation."73
The only way to prevent the federal government from accu-
mulating sugar stocks is to exclude cheap imports. For decades
the United States relied on strict quantitative import quotas for
sugar.7 4 Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), however, prohibits undisguised import quotas. 75 The
"General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions," after all, is a
bedrock principle of international economic law. GATT rests on a
surprisingly simple and elegantly appealing set of golden rules: do
unto others as you do unto others (Article I), and do unto others as
you do unto yourself (Article I11), mindful that tariffs are the least
objectionable of trade barriers and that the community of nations
can negotiate tariffs downward over time (Article II). In 1989, an
international arbitral panel constituted at Australia's request held
that the former American import quota violated GATT.76 In
response, the United States established a two-tiered tariff on
sugar imports. The Tariff Rate Quota adopted in 1990 imposed a
relatively modest tariff of .6250 a pound on the first 2.315 million
70. See 7 U.S.C. § 7272(a) (2000).
71. See id. § 7272(b).
72. The New York Board of Trade reports daily spot prices of sugar and other
market data at http://www.nybot.com. Brazil's Center for Advanced Studies in
Applied Economics (Centro de Estudos Avangados em Economia Aplicada) reports
Brazilian prices at http://cepea.esalq.usp.br; the visitor should click on "Indicadores de
Pregos" and then "Agicar."
73. 7 U.S.C. § 7272(g)(1) (2000).
74. See generally, e.g., United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block, 683
F.2d 399 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (describing the President's power to limit imports under
§ 201(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1821(a)).
75. Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
76. See Report of the Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Sugar,
L/6514 (June 22, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 331 (1989).
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tons of sugar imported into the United States each year.77 Addi-
tional imports faced a stiff tariff of $0.16 a pound, more than
enough to raise the domestic price of sugar above the statutory
minimum loan rate.78
Nearly two decades later, the two-tiered sugar tariff has
remained effectively intact. The 1996 farm bill,79 widely regarded
as the most market-oriented agricultural statute ever adopted by
the federal government,8 0 left the sugar program practically un-
touched.8 1 Under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States as of July 1, 2004, the first 1.117 metric tons (roughly 1.231
short tons) of sugar entering the United States each year-an
amount contingent upon the Secretary of Agriculture's estimates
regarding the adequacy of "domestic supplies of sugars" needed "to
meet domestic demand at reasonable prices"-face a tariff of
1.46060a kilogram, or .6626¢ a pound.8 2 All subsequent imports
are taxed at 33.87¢ a kilogram, or 15.360 a pound.8 3
This program, putatively run at "no cost" to the American
taxpayer, imposes billions of dollars every year in higher con-
sumer prices for sugar.8 4 The legendary political strength of the
77. See Proclamation No. 6179: Modification of Tariffs and Quota on Certain
Sugars, Syrups, and Molasses, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,293 (Sept. 13, 1990).
78. See id.
79. See Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-127, 110 Stat. 888 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 16, 20, and 21 U.S.C.).
80. See generally William D. Coleman, Michael M. Atkinson & Eric Montpetit,
Against the Odds: Retrenchment in Agriculture in France and the United States, 49
WORLD POL. 453 (1997); David Orden, The 1996 Farm Bill: How Much Change and
How Permanent?, in THE AMERICAN FARM BILL: IMPLICATIONS FOR CAP REFORM 23
(David Colman ed., 1997); C. Edwin Young & Paul C. Westcott, The 1996 U.S. Farm
Act Increases Market Orientation, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ECON. RES. SERV., AGRIC.
INFO. BULL. No. 726 (1996).
81. See H.R. REP. No. 104-462, at 46, 65-66 (1996), as reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 611, 618, 638-39; Christopher R. Kelley, Recent Farm Program
Developments, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 93, 117 (1999) (describing the 1996 farm bill as
replacing previous authorizations for nonrecourse loans and marketing assessments in
the sugar program).
82. For chapter 17 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States as of
July 1, 2004, see http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/tariff-chaptersscurrent/0410C17.pdf. The
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is not published in the United States
Code, but it is incorporated by reference into the laws of the United States via 19
U.S.C. § 1202 (2000).
83. See 9 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000); chapter 17 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of
the United States as of July 1, 2004, available at http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/
tariff chapterscurrent041OC17.pdf.
84. Consumer losses from the American sugar program have been pegged
between $1 billion and $2 billion for decades. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INT'L
TRADE ADMIN., UNITED STATES SUGAR POLICY: AN ANALYSIS 10 (Ralph Ives & John
Hurley eds., 1988) (estimating $1.9 billion in lost consumer welfare every year); MARK
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sugar lobby stems from the extreme concentration of benefits
under the program. Legislators from the four states that produce
sugar cane (Florida, Louisiana, Hawaii, and Texas) and the four
that produce the bulk of sugar beets (Minnesota, California, North
Dakota, and Idaho) bear primary responsibility for the sugar
program and the egregiously regressive wealth transfers per-
formed under the program's aegis.8 5 Political support for the
sugar program, however, is by no means limited to these cane-
and beet-producing states. Because high-fructose corn sweeteners
provide a workable (albeit inferior) substitute for sucrose from
cane or beet, the price umbrella erected by the sugar program inci-
dentally shelters a substantial agribusiness market for American
corn growers.8 6 Higher prices for sugar undoubtedly also enhance
the profitability of artificial sweeteners such as aspartame and
saccharin; although some "[p]urchasers of diet products are...
'pathetically eager' to obtain a more slender figure,"87 price also
affects the choice between sugar and non-nutritive sweeteners.
By far the biggest losers are the cane growers in the tropical
sugar-exporting nations who lose access to the world's single
largest market of sugar consumers.88 For what it may be worth-
apparently, not much-many of these nations (except Cuba) are
either allies of the United States, frequent recipients of foreign
assistance financed by American taxpayers, or countries whose
economic and political stability is vital to American national
GROOMBRIDGE, AMERICA'S BITERSWEET SUGAR POLICY 1 (2001) (estimating losses of
up to $1.7 billion); OXFAM, THE GREAT EU SUGAR ScAM 11 (2002) (Oxfam Briefing
Paper No. 27) (valuing foreclosed sugar markets in the United States at approximately
$1.5 billion); Rekha Mehra, Winners and Losers in the U.S. Sugar Program,
RESOURCES, Winter 1989, at 5 (reporting $1 to $1.5 billion in lost consumer welfare
every year).
85. See Monahan, supra note 67, at 338 & nn.114-15; cf. Sara Fisher Ellison &
Wallace P. Mullin, Economics and Politics: The Case of the Sugar Tariff, 38 J.L. &
ECON. 335 (1995) (reviewing congressional votes on sugar tariff reform in 1912).
86. See United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 866 F.2d 242, 246 (8th Cir.
1988) (conceding that "sugar and HFCS [high fructose corn syrup] are functionally
interchangeable for all uses for which HFCS is suitable"); Monahan, supra note 67, at
342; Daniel A. Sumner, Targeting Farm Programs, 9 CONTEMP. POLy ISSUES 93, 101
(1991).
87. United States v. An Article of Food... ' Manischewitz... Diet Thins," 377 F.
Supp. 746, 749 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
88. See United States Department of Agriculture, World Centrifugal Sugar
Production, Supply and Distribution, http://www.fas.usda.gov/psd/complete-tables/
HTP-tablel0-91.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2005); United States Department of
Agriculture, Centrifugal Sugar, http://www.fas.usda.gov/htp/sugar/2005/
May%202005%20PSD.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2005); United States Department of
Agriculture, World Sugar Situation, http://www.fas.usda.govfhtp/sugar/2005/
World%20Sugar%20Situation%2OMay%202005.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
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security.8 9
The federal definition of "major sugar growing, producing,
and exporting countries"90 provides another hint that trade and
tax policies on sugar have become absurd. The sugar program
allows the Secretary of Agriculture to reduce the nonrecourse
loan rate-and thereby to lower the de facto minimum price
received by domestic cane and beet producers-"if the Secretary
determines that negotiated reductions in export subsidies and
domestic subsidies provided for sugar of other major sugar
growing, producing, and exporting countries in the aggregate
exceed the commitments made" by these countries under the
World Trade Organization's Agreement on Agriculture. 9 1 Chief
among the countries designated as "major sugar growing, pro-
ducing, and exporting countries" are "the countries of the
European Union."92 Historically a massive importer of sugar,
molasses, and rum-merely three ways of storing, transporting,
and ultimately consuming highly perishable sugar cane 93-
modern Europe has transformed itself into a leading exporter of
beet sugar through an extremely aggressive program of import
barriers and export subsidies.94 So much for the peculiar hist-
orical establishment of triangular trade.95 To exclude cheaper
sources of sugar, European tariffs on imported sugar reach
140%.96 Export subsidies then push large amounts of European
production overseas. One-fourth of French and British pro-
duction leaves Europe.9 7 The European Union's complex meas-
ures on sugar raise consumer prices within the Union by
89. Cf. Jon Lauck, Note, Against the Grain: The North Dakota Wheat Pooling
Plan and the Liberalization Trend in World Agricultural Markets, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 289, 293-94 (1999) (describing the United States' concern with the stability of
its sugar supplies during the 1920s).
90. 7 U.S.C. § 7272(c)(4)(B) (2000).
91. Id. § 7272(c)(1); see also 19 U.S.C. § 3511(d)(2) (2000).
92. 7 U.S.C. § 7272(c)(4)(B)(i) (2000).
93. Cf. Maneja v. Waialua Agric. Co., 349 U.S. 254, 257 (1955) ("Freshly cut
sugar cane is extremely perishable and must be processed within a few days of
harvesting or serious spoilage will result.").
94. See generally OXFAM, supra note 84, at 4-11.
95. See generally, e.g., ROBERT FINDLAY, TRIANGULAR TRADE AND THE ATLANTIC
ECONOMY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: A SIMPLE GENERAL-EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
(1990).
96. See A.C. Hannah, Consumer Response to Low Prices-Why So Sluggish? 1
(2000), http://www.isosugar.org/publicdownloads/speeches/Tony/ ACHSEMINAR1 100.
pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2005).
97. See European Commission, Agriculture in the European Union-Statistical
and Economic Information, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/
agristaI2000/tableenien43.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2005).
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roughly €800 million each year. 98 In all, European sugar costs
three times the world market price, and European farmers and
processors are the world's biggest beneficiaries of sugar sub-
sidies. 99 These First World farmers are hardly "the wretched of
the earth," certainly not by the standards of a larger world in
which disgracefully large numbers of men, women, and most of
all children "live in the streets and beg for scraps of garbage to
eat."1
00
Sugar support programs in America and in Europe ensure
that rampant inequality remains an essential part of "the price of
the sugar [we] eat."10 1 The American program alone delivers up to
$60,000 per year in benefits to the average beet or cane farmer in
the United States. 10 2 Owners of American sugar plantations, it
bears repeating, are not "the wretched of the earth." Why indeed
should a prosperous entrepreneurial class in the world's wealth-
iest and mightiest nation benefit at the expense of the poor at
home and overseas? Even if its beneficiaries were worthy reci-
pients of public largess, the American sugar program "is a highly
inefficient means of achieving its stated goal of domestic producer
support."103 "For every dollar transferred to U.S. sugar producers,
U.S. consumers pay [$]2.56 to [$]2.62 ...."104 Without drawing a
single dime from the budget of the United States, the sugar pro-
gram would approach the economic impact of the fiscally intense
farm support programs that historically committed the federal
government to spend $80,000 per year for each farm job saved. 10 5
Indeed, putative "independence" from the federal budget pro-
vides further reason to despise the sugar program. Other farm
programs at least have the decency to draw from the federal
budget. The practical effect of the sugar program--or, for that
98. See Court of Auditors, Special Report No. 20/2000 concerning the
management of the common organisation of the market for sugar, together with the
Commission replies, 2001 O.J. (C 50) 1, at 80.
99. See BRENT BORRELL & DAVID PEARCE, SUGAR: THE TASTE TEST OF TRADE
LIBERALISATION 6 (1999).
100. Mark A. Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare,
and Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 818 (1997).
101. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE, OR OPTIMISM 40 (Robert M. Adams trans., 2d ed. 1991).
102. See Monahan, supra note 67, at 341.
103. Id. at 344.
104. Id.
105. See Thomas W. Hertzel et al., Economywide Effects of Unilateral Trade and
Policy Liberalization in U.S. Agriculture, in MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
FARM SUPPORT POLICIES 260, 261 (Andrew B. Stoeckel et al. eds., 1989); Jeffrey J.
Steinle, Note, The Problem Child of World Trade: Reform School for Agriculture, 4
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 333, 340-41 (1995).
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matter, of any other legal scheme that raises consumer prices by
erecting barriers to trade-is identical to that of an excise tax.106
Engel's law describes an inverse relationship between income and
food consumption: ceteris paribus, as a consumer's income
increases, the proportion spent on food decreases. 107 Because the
poor spend a disproportionately higher percentage of their limited
incomes on food, the de facto tax on sugar is overtly regressive.
In 2004, a panel of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
ruled, in a petition brought by Brazil, Australia, and Thailand,
that the European Union's sugar program was illegal. 108 In April
2005, the Appellate Body of the WTO issued a final ruling
ordering Europe to stop dumping subsidized sugar on global mar-
kets.10 9 As of this writing, the opposing parties continue to contest
the precise terms by which the European Union must finally con-
cede defeat in this long-running dispute.110 Whatever the time-
table for European compliance, some stark facts are now settled.
The European Union exported roughly four million metric tons of
sugar in 2001, or three times the Union's limit for that period.
The three victorious parties in the European sugar dispute-
Brazil, Australia, and Thailand-are countries that once fell
within European spheres of colonial influence and are on balance
106. See, e.g., A.B. ATKINSON & J.E. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS
20 (1980).
107. See MARGUERITE C. BURK, CONSUMPTION ECONOMICS: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY
APPROACH 87 (1968); BENJAMIN SENAUER, ELAINE ASP & JEAN KINSEY, FOOD TRENDS
AND THE CHANGING CONSUMER 134 (1991); cf. Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of
Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1647 (1998) ("[W]e do know, with all
but metaphysical certainty, ... that no human being has ever eaten an adult
hippopotamus in one sitting .... ).
108. See Panel Report, European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar,
Complaint by Australia, WT/DS265/R (Oct. 15, 2004); Panel Report, European
Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar, Complaint by Brazil, WT/DS266/R (Oct.
15, 2004); Panel Report, European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar,
Complaint by Thailand, WT/DS283/R (Oct. 15, 2004).
109. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Export Subsidies on
Sugar, WT/DS265AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WTJDS283/AB/R (Apr. 28, 2005).
110. See European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar (Aug. 11, 2005),
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/tUWT/DS/283-1l.doc (request for arbi-
tration under Article 21.3(c) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding to establish a
reasonable period of time for the implementation of the Dispute Settlement Body's
resolution of the European sugar subsidy controversy). For further background, see
generally Mark Clough, Sugar, Agricultural Subsidies and the WTO Dispute, 9 INT'L
TRADE L. & REG. 126 (2003); Chris Milner et al., Would All ACP Sugar Protocol
Exporters Lose from Sugar Liberalization, 16 EUR. J. DEV. & RES. 790 (2004); Food
& Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Effects of Trade Liberalization on
the World Sugar Market (1999), available at http://www.fao.org/es/ESC/eni
20953/21032/21661/highlight_26367en.html.
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less prosperous than the member states of the European Union.
Europe nevertheless bears the embarrassing task of defending
subsidies to a class of rich entrepreneurs against a legal challenge
posed by a modestly wealthy trio of postcolonial countries. All the
while, the truly wretched countries of the developing world, which
have a proportionally far greater stake in this dispute, await the
eventual resolution of the European sugar war.
Back in the United States, the unhappy persistence of the
two-tiered sugar tariff is reminiscent of an older episode in
American trade policy. During the early 1980s, the United States
government pressured the Japanese automobile industry to adopt
a set of socially and politically expensive voluntary export
restraints (VERs).111 American taxpayers could have paid $37,000
during 1984 alone for each of the 23,800 autoworking jobs that
would have been lost but for the imposition of VERs.1 12 The resul-
ting $881 million welfare program--designed according to the
average 1984 American autoworker's wages-would have been far
cheaper than the $3 billion that American consumers absorbed
that year in higher car prices.1 13 That figure does not include
additional savings attributable to the correction of spending
patterns that were otherwise distorted by the VERs. The
malicious distributional impact of this protectionist scheme also
bears noting. During the VERs' heyday, the average autoworker
earned $15,000 more than the average American worker.1 14 Yet
the political debate over public support for the American auto
industry in the 1980s never considered a direct, "Chrysler-style"
bailout of the United Auto Workers.
Coffee, cream, and sugar tell three starkly different tales
within the law of trade and development. These three commo-
dities span the full spectrum of domestic and international legal
policies that can be manipulated to yield different distributions of
wealth among and within nations. Coffee is a freely traded
commodity, a market whose relatively modest inequities lend
111. See CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ, JR., TRADING PLACES 421-23 (1989) (documenting
the international and domestic maneuvering that led to the negotiation of the VERs);
cf. JUNICHI GOTo, LABOR IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON
JAPANESE-AMERICAN ISSUES 48-74 (1990) (describing the impact of labor relations
within the American automobile industry on Japanese-American trade relations at
large).
112. See Junichi Goto, Imperfect Competition and the Japan-US Automobile
Trade, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE MODELING 107, 125-26 (M.G. Dagenais & P.A Muet
eds., 1992).
113. See id.
114. See id. at 126.
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themselves to voluntary correction through socially conscious
labeling and marketing practices. At the other extreme, the tradi-
tional approach to sugar in American, European, and inter-
national law has effected systematic and substantial transfers of
wealth from hapless consumers and downtrodden farmers to
sheltered First World producers. On a domestic basis and a more
modest scale, the American dairy program achieves what the
sugar program accomplishes on a global basis. The operative
constraint is not Congress's "underdeveloped capacity for self-
restraint,"115 but the weight and perishability of dairy products
vis-A-vis processed sugar.
If history's various economic wars have taught us anything, it
is the enduring value of free trade. In the United States, the com-
mon market established by the Dormant Commerce Clause is one
of the Constitution's most important economic, political, and social
baselines.116 At the global level, the Bretton Woods treaties form
a comparably powerful foundation. 117 At home and abroad,
antitrust law and competition policy unequivocally recognize
competition as the fuel of progress.118 The same wisdom, however,
has yet to persuade many commentators on the law of trade and
development.
"Some truths are so basic that, like the air around us, they
are easily overlooked."'1 9 Free trade is an essential and effective
instrument of redistribution, typically in favor of downtrodden
consumers at the expense of fat, sheltered producers. Precisely
because trade erodes domestic producers' well-being for the
benefit of consumers not only at home but also abroad, many
domestic legislators oppose trade. 120 As a result, although free
trade should command a firm commitment within the political
agenda of redistribution-minded progressives in the United States
and in the world at large, it does not. In fact, the opposite is true.
"If patriotism is... the last refuge of the scoundrel, wrapping out-
115. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 588 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
116. See, e.g., Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 650 (1994) (describing
the "securing [of] a national area of free trade" as the "central objective" of the dormant
commerce clause (internal quotation marks omitted)); Boston Stock Exchange v. State
Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977) (same); McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S.
327, 330 (1944) (same).
117. See generally Jim Chen, Pax Mercatoria: Globalization as a Second Chance at
"Peace for Our Time," 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 217 (2001).
118. See Jim Chen, The Vertical Dimension of Cooperative Competition Policy, 48
ANTITRUST BULL. 1005, 1034 (2003).
119. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992).
120. See Farber, supra note 21, at 1572; Farber & Hudec, supra note 18, at 1406.
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dated industry in the mantle of national interest is the last refuge
of... economically dispossessed" producers.121 Opposition to free
trade is as predictable as it is vicious. Organized interests (such
as domestic producers) hold an overwhelming political advantage
over "anonymous and diffuse" majorities, especially faceless con-
sumers.122 Political leverage reaches its apex when competition
hails from abroad. 123 Democracy should not have losers,124 but it
does. The price of electoral democracy in matters of politics is
eternal vigilance within the law of international trade.
The task of the Minnesota Journal of International Law is
likewise eternal. In a world that knows but despises the entrench-
ment of poverty,1 25 the task of international law consists of impro-
ving the human condition not in "favored spots alone, but the
whole Earth."126 Although a "science which hesitates to forget its
founders is lost"127 and "progress in a scientific discipline can be
measured by how quickly its founders are forgotten,"128 this
journal would do well to heed its roots in the law of international
trade. Few if any other uses of this journal's pages would vindi-
cate as thoroughly the interests of the world's poorest. Economic
development, after all, is also a human right.129 Reconciling
democracy with development fits squarely within the established
legal framework for assessing and securing human rights. A
sounder view of the developmental dynamic treats wealth as a
precondition for rights, not a competitor or a substitute.130
Development affects even environmental integrity, not least by
121. KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL
ECONOMIES 62 (1995).
122. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-
24 (1985).
123. See ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE & ROBERT E. LITAN, SAVING FREE TRADE: A
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 23-24 (1986).
124. See generally Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, Democracy Should Not Have Losers, 9
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 589 (2000).
125. Cf. John 12:8 ('The poor you always have with you....") (Revised Standard
Version).
126. WORDSWORTH, supra note 3, at 550.
127. The Wit and Wisdom of Alfred North Whitehead,
http://www.alfred.north.whitehead.com/witwiz/witwiz4.htm (last visited Sept. 27,
2005).
128. EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 182-83
(1998).
129. See, e.g., Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Vienna, June 14-25,
1993, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24; cf. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 20(4), June
5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, 831 (1992) (declaring the "eradication of poverty" to be a
paramount developmental objective under the Convention).
130. See generally, Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 83
(2002).
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paying a "green dividend" as rising incomes spur a taste for
environmental amenities and the means with which to pay for
them. 131 Among the seemingly countless environmental problems
in this mutually dependent world, "persistent poverty may turn
out to be the most aggravating and destructive."'132 We must
remember "above all else" that "human degradation and
deprivation.., constitute the greatest threat not only to national,
regional, and world security, but to essential life-supporting
ecological systems." 133
Quite fortuitously, the transformation of this journal
coincides with hints, however faint, that legal commitments to the
free movement of goods, services, and labor do persist at home and
abroad. In a world wracked with war and turmoil, two arms of
the United States government in 2005 adopted modest measures
that reflected some degree of hope in free trade and open markets.
By the razor-thin margins of 5-4 and 217-215, respectively, the
Supreme Court of the United States expanded the right to pur-
chase wine without regard to state boundaries, 34 and the United
States House of Representatives approved the Central American
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). 135 This regional trade pact
passed political muster despite the virtual certainty that wealthy
American cane and beet farmers will lose a share of the sugar
market to their poorer counterparts throughout the rest of the
CAFTA region. Both of these landmark developments in favor of
trade came to pass during the glorious summer of 2005, that
aestas mirabilis when the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade
became the Minnesota Journal of International Law. Happy days
indeed are here again.
131. See, e.g., GENE M. GROSSMAN & ALAN D. KRUEGER, ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACTS OF A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 5 (1991); PETER HUBER,
HARD GREEN 151 (2000); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 4-6, 22-24 (1992).
132. Patrick Low, Trade and the Environment: What Worries the Developing
Countries?, 23 ENVTL. L. 705, 706 (1993).
133. James A. Lee, Conservation in a World in Search of a Future, in
CONSERVATION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 284, 287 (David Western & Mary C.
Pearl eds., 1989).
134. See Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005).
135. H.R. 3045, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REC. H6884 (2005).
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